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This study examines investor reaction to the appointment of female directors in New Zealand-listed companies.
Using the event study method, we ϐind that female directors tend to be appointed as independent directors rather
than in a Chief Executive Ofϐicer (CEO) role. The results reveal that female board appointments are generally neg-
atively associated with stock performance. This study captures both the gender diversity arising in New Zealand
companies and the performance of stock price resulting from the reaction of investors to the different positions of
female directors. The evidence of a decrease in market performance is shown by the negative cumulative average
abnormal returns (CAARs) from the announcements of women appointees to the board.
© 2018 TAF Publishing. All rights reserved.
INTRODUCTION
Gender diversity within a corporate board and the ϐirm’s
market performance has been of increasing interest in aca-
demic and business circles. The contribution of women
directors to ϐirm value has been widely studied in the ex-
isting literature across various countries (Anggadwita &
Dhewanto, 2016; Bilimoria, 2000; Burke, 2000; Boulouta,
2013; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Dunn, 2012; Huse,
2008; Kabongo, Chang, & Li, 2013; Kang, Ding, & Charoen-
wong, 2010; Mathisen, Ogaard, & Marnburg, 2013; Virta-
nen, 2012). The growing interest about women director-
ship has resulted in an increasing number of women direc-
tors on corporate boards (Branson, 2011; Catalyst, 2004;
Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Salam, 2016). In Canada, the per-
centage increased by 4.2% from 2003 to 2005 (Catalyst,
2004). Female directors onboards in France increased from
12.3% in 2010 to 22.3% in 2012 (Kabongo et al., 2013).
Moreover, legitimacy encourages and results in recruitment
for directorship fromwomen. (Branson, 2011; Dunn, 2012;
Kabongo et al., 2013). Norway and France have gender
quota legislation and many other European countries fol-
lowed suit (Kabongo et al., 2013). In addition, different
perspectives of women directorship inϐluences have also
been studied (Boulouta, 2013; Mathisen et al., 2013; Vir-
tanen, 2012). For instance, a recent study analyzed the per-
sonal characteristics, careers and boardroom roles of gen-
der to investigate the effect in Finnish business by Virtanen
(2012) and Boulouta (2013) found Board Gender Diver-
sity (BGD) had signiϐicant effect on Corporate Social Perfor-
mance (CSP) based on 126 samples of S&P 500 ϐirms.
In New Zealand, the percentage of women on corporate
boards has increased over a 10-year period from 8.65% in
2008 to 22.17% in 2017 (McGregor & Davis-Tana, 2017).
The objective of this paper is to examine whether this dra-
matic increase in the appointment of women directors on
the boards of ϐirms listed on the New Zealand Exchange
(NZX) adds to their ϐirm value. Collectiveworks have shown
the necessity of appointing female directors by the results
of positive relationship between appointments and the ϐirm
value (Boulouta, 2013; Catalyst, 2004; Kabongo et al., 2013;
Nisser & Ayedh, 2017). However, academicians tend to fo-
cus their studies on countries with strong economic power
such as the U.S.A., Australia, South Africa and those inWest-
ern Europe; few of them focus on countries of less economic
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power. Within New Zealand, there is hardly any work on
the relationship of gender diversity and corporate market
performance. This paper ϐills the gap and makes a num-
ber of contributions to the existing literature. First, it en-
riches the empirical evidence on the valuation of appoint-
ing femaledirectors. byproviding ϐindings for smaller coun-
tries. Second, it echoes the increasing cries for appointing
female leadership in view of the under-representation of fe-
male board directors. For example, a search of Factiva, a
global magazine and news source, ϐinds 28 articles in New
Zealand news that are related to female directorships from
2009 to 2013, while only 10 announcements of female ap-
pointments are found from 2000 to 2005.
Theunder-representation ofwomendirectorships has been
widely acknowledged. The results of this study shows
whether increasing the number of women directors is eco-
nomically viable for New Zealand. The positive or nega-
tive ϐinancial reactions of appointing femaledirectors deter-
mine whether greater female representation on the board
adds or reduces market value of the ϐirms involved.
The existing literature suggests that greater participation
of women directors in ϐirms optimizes the gender struc-
ture of corporates and thereforemaximizes the ϐirms’ value.
The anecdotal evidence of companies with more women on
their board outperform those with fewer or no women di-
rectors is the motivation for appointing women directors.
In this paper, a standard event study method is used.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section
2 reviews the existing literature and develops our research
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology
of our research. In section 4, the empirical results and im-
plications are discussed. Section 5 provides our concluding
remarks.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOP-
MENT
Arguments for greater female representation on the board
can be split into two categories: ethical and economic
(Altantsetseg, Chen, & Chang, 2017; Campbell & Vera,
2010; Sun, Liu, & Lan, 2011). The former indicates that
it is immoral for females to be excluded from corporate
boardrooms due to their gender and that ϐirms should
increase the proportion of females in order to achieve
a more equitable outcome for society due to the under-
representation of female directors (Campbell & Mı́nguez-
Vera, 2008). Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin (2007) ar-
gued that ϐirms should regard greater female representa-
tion not as a means to an end but as a desirable end it-
self. The economic arguments are based on the compo-
sition of women directors which, hopefully, will enhance
the ϐinancial performance of the ϐirms. For example, the
report from Catalyst (2004), a research group focused on
female advancement in leadership, ϐinds that Fortune 500
ϐirmswithmorewomen directors outperformed thosewith
fewer women on the boardroom. An event study of listed
ϐirms in Spain shows a similar result. Having female direc-
tors on board has a positive and signiϐicant effect on long
term ϐirm value, while controlling for the other possible de-
terminants of ϐirm value (Campbell & Mı́nguez-Vera, 2008).
Similarly, Kang et al. (2010) ϐind that investors generally re-
spond positively to the appointment of women directors in
Singapore, in particularly, to be more receptive to indepen-
dent female directors. Finally, the Microϐinance Institution
(MFI), an institutionproviding ϐinancial service topoor fam-
ilies and small business of developing countries, shows that
a female CEO induces a higher ϐinancial performance inMFI
(Strom, D’Espallier, & Mersland, 2014).
The underlying motive of greater gender diversity in the
board of directors is to elevate ϐirms’ competitive advan-
tage. According to the existing literature, the inϐluence of
the appointment of female directors on corporate boards
can be categorized as external and internal. The external
inϐluence maintains a positive image with shareholders for
the ϐirms. The presence of female directors on board of-
fers legitimacy within the industry by displaying gender di-
versity on board. It presents a positive image by impress-
ing shareholders andmembers of publicwho are concerned
with issue of gender diversity and advance ϐirms’ reputation
(Bilimoria, 2006; Catalyst, 2004; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
Bilimoria (2006) ϐinds institutional legitimacy that ϐirms
seek relates to board diversity. This is due to large institu-
tional investors tending to believe that board diversity cre-
ates positive beneϐits to ϐirm value. On the other hand, a
survey made by Burke (1997) indicated that chief execu-
tives believe that having female directors on board brings
positive prospects for their own career.
The internal inϐluence of gender diversity on ϐirm perfor-
mance is through the role of governance. Gender diver-
sity brings creativity, innovation and resources to the board
(Campbell & Mı́nguez-Vera, 2008; Huse, 2008; Virtanen,
2012; Wasike, 2017). Several studies link ϐirm innovation
to board diversity. For example, Torchia, Calabrò, and Huse
(2011) notes that board structure inϐluences corporate in-
novation by allocating resources and providing ideas. In
the process of ϐirmmanagement, gender diversity provides
innovations by different individual perspectives. It is ar-
gued that board of directors is regarded as a necessary el-
ement for supporting innovation activities (Zahra & Stan-
ISSN: 2414-309X
DOI: 10.20474/jabs-4.5.3
249 J. Admin. Bus. Stud. 2018
ton, 1988). Indeed, the studies that address the aspects
that gender diversity has impact on corporatemanagement.
“Groupthink” can be avoided as to reduce the failure led by
the complacency (Branson, 2011). For example, Bertrand
and Schoar (2003) suggest that female directors and man-
agers create a new management style, which can therefore
increase the ϐirm governance and performance. In addition,
Virtanen (2012) and Huse (2008) argue that women direc-
tors on boards appear active and credible in the way they
address board work; they differ frommale members on the
board and thus contribute various ways to the variety for
governance tasks. Indeed,womenbehavemore courteously
and sensitively than men (Virtanen, 2012).
Moving into greater detail, genderdiversity enhances the ef-
ϐiciency of board decision-makingwhendiverse issues arise
(Adebayo & Bilquis, 2018; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003;
Huse, 2008; Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles, 1997; Virtanen,
2012). Shrader et al. (1997) notes that the rubber-stamping
questions can be solved with better efϐiciency due to the
questioning culture presented by women directors. In-
deed, women tend to have stronger feelings about their un-
derlying value, leading to a stronger willingness to raise
their voice when encountering conϐlicting views (Virtanen,
2012). The critical questioning, advising, and consulting at-
titude held by female directors assist the ϐirms’ problem-
solving and governance (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005).
Conversely, by taking a broader view, the participation
of female members on the board promotes better under-
standing of the complexity of business environment and for
better matching of potential customers (Campbell & Vera,
2010; Strom et al., 2014). With better matching between
the leadership team and market conditions, ϐirms can in-
crease their ability to penetrate markets (Campbell & Vera,
2010). As consumers, women aremore active and aremore
comfortable in communicating the views on behalf of con-
sumers to the boardroom for discussion (Dunn, 2012). On
the other hand, appointingwomendirectors can reduce risk
when making decisions since women are more sensitive
and conservative to risk-taking than men (Branson, 2011;
Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998). Hence, increasing women
directors in corporate boards has been shown to enhance
market share and less risky strategic ϐinancial decisions.
Many studies on gender diversity have identiϐied that dif-
ferent resources and external linkages outside the organiza-
tion brought in by female directors contribute positively to
corporation performance (Brown, Brown, & Anastasopou-
los, 2002; Branson, 2011; Hillman, Cannella Jr, & Harris,
2002). The knowledge, experience, expertise, individual
reputations and relationships to other networks and orga-
nizations can be regard as human capital, which may en-
hance the likelihood of ϐirms’ success (Hillman et al., 2002).
For example, a study by Dunn (2012) on the appointment
of female directors to single male boards in Canadian ϐirms
indicates that women generally are highly skilled with sup-
porting expertise in the ϐields of ϐinance and the law. There
is evidence provided by Shrader et al. (1997) that women
appear to be more oriented toward supporting and main-
taining relationships than men. As such, the characteris-
tics of female directors, including high education, special-
ized skills, experiences, social interaction, and external re-
lationships can impact their ϐirms positively.
However, there are arguments that the appointment of
women directors is merely a token and a display to commit-
ment of gender-neutral policies rather than an actual and
practical factor of adding value to ϐirms (Elstad & Ladegard,
2012; Kanter, 1997; Torchia et al., 2011). The tokenism
theory proposed by Kanter (1997) notes those female di-
rectors as a minority group exerts less inϐluence than the
dominant group of male directors on the board. Females,
as a group, are subject to discrimination and thus barriers
are formed, ending up with less power to affect board deci-
sions. He theorizes that, when female directors exceed the
“token” limit of 15%, the barriers will be removed. A study
by Elstad and Ladegard (2012) indicates that the women
ratio is increasing substantially in the workforce by a 40%
women ratio among Norwegian corporations. However, the
relevance between the proportion of women and ϐirm per-
formance remains a question to be explored. Furthermore,
several studies have discussed the problems of female in-
volvement. They argue that the proportion of women on
corporate boards and the company’s industry affect the per-
formance of women directors (Carter et al., 2003; Konrad,
Kramer, & Erkut, 2008). Konrad et al. (2008) ϐinds that a
critical mass is vital for measuring the inϐluence of women
directors. For instance, ϐirmswith three ormorewomen di-
rectors tend to beneϐit most from their contribution.
As more women join the corporate board, the female di-
rectors are able to raise issues more freely and to be heard
by their male colleagues on the board. In addition, a study
of UK ϐirms indicates that the majority of female directors
are involved in the sector of retailing, banking, the media,
and utilities while sectors like resources, engineering, and
business service have less participation of women directors
(Brammer et al., 2007). This implies that ϐirms perform
better when the leadership has similar traits (such as gen-
der) as their clients. According to the study of the Micro-
ϐinance Institution (MFI), Strom et al. (2014) suggest that
ϐirms should match the proportion of female clients with
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that of female directorships. Moreover, the existence of fe-
male stereotypes in career choice is evident. For instance,
as summarized by Kang et al. (2010), in the industry which
is widely accepted as female-typed such as nursing and ad-
ministration, female workers are selected (Blau & Ferber,
1985; Freieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman, 1978).
What concerns investors is the relation between ϐirm per-
formance and the appointment of female directors, which
will directly affect their response when the announcement
of the appointment of female directors is made. As the mo-
tives of female board appointments have been addressed
above, including the beneϐits related to ϐirmgovernance and
relevant advantages to corporation management, we pro-
pose the following two hypotheses:
H1: Listed ϐirms experiencenon-positive abnormal returns
on their announcement of the appointment of female direc-
tors.
Although there is empirical evidence to the positive ab-
normal return, many studies present conϐlicting evidence
(Shrader et al., 1997; Virtanen, 2012). For example, Shrader
et al. (1997) ϐind among large ϐirms in the U.S.A., the associ-
ation between women directors and ϐinancial performance
is negativewithout great signiϐicance. Furthermore, a study
of Danish ϐirms ϐinds there is no signiϐicant association of
Tobin’s Q and female directors (Shrader et al., 1997). Sim-
ilarly, a study of listed companies in Finland conducted by
Virtanen (2012) reveals that there is hardly any difference
a between having women and men directors on the boards.
Female and male directors share remarkable similarities:
being critical and changeable to board issues. Hence, there
is no large difference from the market response to gender
diversity.
H2: Listed ϐirms experience positive abnormal returns on
their announcement of the appointment of female directors.
A large proportion of research has reported positive gains
due to the beneϐits of gender diversity (Boulouta, 2013;
Carter et al., 2003; Campbell &Mı́nguez-Vera, 2008; Kang et
al., 2010; Strom et al., 2014). In terms of the Spanish mar-
ket, Campbell and Mı́nguez-Vera (2008) document a posi-
tive effect on ϐirm value from the announcements of female
director appointments using panel data analysis. Thus, eco-
nomic gains may be generated by increasing female board
memberships. This result is robust to different event study
approaches and varying time periods. They ϐind that the
stock market reacts positively in both the short term and
over a sustained period (Campbell & Vera, 2010). Similarly,
in U.S. market, generally, board gender diversity has a pos-
itive impact on overall corporate social performance using
panel data analysis and instrumental variable (IV) method
(Boulouta, 2013). Kang et al. (2010) ϐind a similar result
using the event study method for the Singapore stock mar-
ket. Moreover, institutions such as the MIF ϐind that female
CEOs are positively related with ϐirms’ contrasting gover-
nance and ϐinancial performance (Strom et al., 2014).
There are various positions towhich a female director could
be appointed: a CEO, chairman, a non-CEO executive di-
rector or an outside director of a company. Inside posi-
tions such as CEO include the most senior corporate exec-
utive or administrator in charge of managing an organiza-
tion, either an individual or an agency can be appointed
(MacKenzie, 2006). In this paper, CEOs are individuals
rather than agencies. In the U.S.A., many CEOs are also ap-
pointed as Chairmen of the ϐirms at the same time. This is
referred to as CEO-Chair duality. In countries like Japan and
the U.K., Chairmen are non-executives of the ϐirms; they are
largely responsible for supervisingmanagers andmaintain-
ing relations among government, society, and business cir-
cles (Menz, 2012). CEO-Chair duality is often used to mea-
sure governance mechanisms since ϐirms are more likely to
combine the functions of CEO and chair (Strom et al., 2014).
However, the power concentration of CEO-chair is criticized
by governance recommendations for its lack of supervision
for the ϐirms. It has been found that CEO-chair duality is
negatively relatedwith ϐirm performance (Farrell & Hersch,
2005; Strom et al., 2014). A possible explanation for this
result is that less business is conducted when the decision-
making time is prolonged (Strom et al., 2014).
Outside directors are non-executive directors who have
an independent role on the board or providing advice
and counseling to executive directors, they are indepen-
dent or have business interests beyond those of a direc-
tor (Bezemer, Maassen, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007;
Kang et al., 2010). A recent paper by Strom et al. (2014)
supports the notion that that female CEOs are positively re-
lated to ϐirms’ ϐinancial performance, which is similar to
the ϐindings of Shrader et al. (1997). However, these stud-
ies do not address the speciϐic relation between CEO and
non-CEOdirectors, particularly the non-executive directors.
Findings by Kang et al. (2010) indicate that investors tend
to be more receptive towards female directors than female
CEOs in the Singaporean market as the Average Abnormal
Returns (AAR) dropped by 1.3%on the announcement date
while there is an increaseof 1.5% in theAAR for ϐirms if non-
CEO female directors are appointed. An oft-cited article by
Kanter (1997) attributes this phenomenon towomendirec-
tors’ tendency to experience gender stereotypes in top roles
on the board since female CEOs are still rare among ϐirms
and investors. This leads us to the following hypotheses.
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H3: Themarket reactsmore positively to the appointments
of non-CEO female directors to the board than CEO/chair
appointments.
H4: Themarket reactsmore positively to the appointments
of female CEOs to the board than non-CEO appointments
The conϐlicting empirical results generated by different re-
searchers can be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, the
difference in methodology in research may generate differ-
ent empirical evidence. For example, event studies, cross-
sectional and panel data analysis, and natural experiment
setting are approaches that are distinct fromeach other, and
may yield conϐlicting results. Secondly, the studies ondiffer-
ent countries over a different time period can show diverse
results. Due to differences in the ϐinancial environment and
discrepancies of the legal environment, stock market re-
sponses to gender diversitymay vary from country to coun-
try. Moreover, the economic state differs from time to time,
thus different time periodsmay have large impact on the re-
sults.
DATA ANDMETHODOLOGY
Sample Collection
The data on the announcements onwomen directorship are
collected from theNewZealand Stock Exchange (NZX) com-
pany search. For each NZX-listed company, the date of each
director’s appointment is accessible from the company’s an-
nual reports together with the ϐirm’s governance informa-
tion, which are available on the NZX website.
By searching the keyword “director appointment” and
choosing the category of directorship change from January
1, 2009 to December 4, 2013, 1109 appointments are re-
trieved from a list of 208 listed ϐirms in New Zealand. The
following selection criteria are used. First, there must be
at least one announcement of a woman director appoint-
ment in each year. Then, to distinguish the gender of the ap-
pointed directors, the gender of the director is veriϐied from
the corporation’s annual report and Factiva to ensure that
only appointments of women directors are collected. Thus,
announcements with only men appointed and announce-
ments with more than one gender are excluded. Of all the
ϐirms, 58 announcements from 42 companies meet this cri-
terion. Third, the company’s ticker code is veriϐied using Ya-
hoo Finance to select only companies that are listed solely
on the New Zealand market and not cross-listed elsewhere.
This step eliminates 3 companies, so we are left with 39
companies with 52 announcements.
When selecting the announcement date, only the earliest
announcement is chosen. It should be noted that if the an-
nouncement wasmade after the trading hours, the next day
would be regarded as the announcement date (t = 0). This
guides us in the selection of suitable stock price. In order to
estimate the parameters in the ϐinancial event study, there
must be at least 150 tradingdaysprior to the announcement
date in order to generate the parameters of the event study
regressions.
Whenanalysing thedata of the52announcements of the ap-
pointment of female directors by the 39 ϐirms in the event
period, we list the number of female directors on a year-
by-year basis (Table 1). We observe that the total num-
ber of female announcements increased by 200% in 2013
compared with the number in 2009 and that the number
of announcements has grown continuously every year from
2009 to 2013.
TABLE 1. Number of announcements by year
Year Number of Announcements
2009 6
2010 6
2011 12
2012 13
2013 15
Total 52
Table 2 reports the distribution of female directors ap-
pointed in various industry sectors according to the classi-
ϐication of Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial
Classiϐication (ANZSIC) 2006. We observe that the major-
ity of announcements of female appointments to corporate
boards aremade by ϐirms in themanufacturing and produc-
tion sector, ϐinancial and insurance services sector, and in-
formation communications and technology sector. Interest-
ingly, ϐirms belonging to the ϐirst two classiϐications consti-
tute half of the total number of ϐirms that announced female
director appointments.
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TABLE 2. Number of announcements by industry sector
Sector Number of Announcements Number of Firms
Manufacturing and production 14 10
Financial and insurance services 11 9
Information communications and technology 8 3
Construction 3 2
Rental, hiring and real estate services 2 2
Health care and social assistance 2 2
Arts and recreation services 2 1
Transport, postal and warehousing 2 2
Retail and wholesale trade 7 7
Petroleum and energy 1 1
Total 52 39
Methodology
In this study, a standard ϐinancial event study method is ap-
plied to estimate the effect of female appointments. The
event window is deϐined as 21 trading days around the an-
nouncement day, which includes 10 trading days before the
announcement date and 10 trading days after. The esti-
mation window is set for the period starting from 150 to
11 trading days prior to the announcement date. The an-
nouncement date is set as day 0, which is the ofϐicial trading
day of the company’s announcement. If the date happens to
fall on a weekend, public holiday or the announcement was
made after the trading hours of that day, then the next trad-
ing day is taken as day 0. By deϐinition, the day after the
announcement day is designated as day 1while one day be-
fore is day-1. t-tests are applied to test the signiϐicant of the
results.
During the estimation period when the event does not take
place, in order to expect a normal return, we apply the index
market model as follows:
R(J;t) = j + jR(m;t) + "(j;t) (1)
where R(m;t) is the return of the market on day t using the
return from theNZX50 index,j is the interceptwhich stock
j’s return with zero market return. It is a stable component
of the share returns for ϐirm j and is consistent over time. j
is the slope which measures how stock j is sensitive to the
market and "(j;t) is a random error termwithmean of 0 and
standard deviation of 1.
The abnormal return from an announcement is the differ-
ence between actual ex post returns and normal returns
over an event window:
ARj;t = Rj;t   Rj;t (2)
where AR(j;t) is the abnormal return of the stock j on day
t, R(j;t) is the actual return of stock j on day t as shown in
equation (1), and R(j;t) is the estimated return of stock j on
day t. The average abnormal return for day t can be com-
puted as:
AARt =
NX
j=1
AR(j;t)
N
(3)
where AR(j;t) is as deϐined in Equation 2 and N refers to
the total number of announcements (which is 52 in this pa-
per). The daily stock returns and equities information are
obtained from the Yahoo Finance website.The Cumulative
Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) are deϐined as:
CAARab =
NX
j=1
AARt (4)
where CAARab refers to the cumulative average abnormal
returns from day a to day b. To test the signiϐicance of the
average abnormal returns (AAR), the following t-statistics
is employed:
t =
AARt
S
(5)
where S refers to the standard deviation of abnormal re-
turns during the estimation period. The t-test for the CAAR
from day a to day b is:
tab =
CAARab
S
p
X
(6)
where X is the number of days fromday a to day b, inclusive.
In this article, the event study method is also applied for
testing Hypothesis H3 and H4.
The CAARs over the event window (day 0 and 1) are the
measurement for investors’ reaction when a female CEO
and chair is appointed. By comparing the ϐluctuations of
CAARs of non-CEO executive directors and independent di-
rectors, the gap of investors’ reaction toward the appoint-
ments of CEO and non-CEO female directors can be ob-
served. TheCAARoverday0and1 captures the information
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on a two-day announcement period and the reactions of in-
vestors to the information since announcements more are
more likely to be made at the end of the trading day (Kang
et al., 2010). The necessary information of different posi-
tions appointed are provided in the ϐirms’ annual reports
through NZX50 and Factiva, which enables us to distinguish
between the genders of the appointed directors.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this study, the results show that investors tend to re-
spondnegatively towards the appointments of female direc-
tors in the New Zealand market.
Table 3 provides the summary descriptive statistics of the
ϐirms in the event study from days -10 to 10. There are 52
announcements made by 39 ϐirms, of which only two an-
nouncements are for the appointment of female CEO/Chair
directors. It can be observed that, on average, the 39 ϐirms
experience a negative average abnormal return of -0.53%,
which is consistentwith the hypothesisH1 that the appoint-
ment of female directors is associated negatively the ϐirms’
market performance.
Table 4 reports the results of the event study analysiswhere
the AAR and CAAR for each trading day in the eventwindow
of (-10, 10) is presented. From the table, we can observe
that 39 ϐirms (with 52 announcements) experience a signif-
icant decrease in average abnormal return
TABLE 3. Summary descriptive statistics
AAR
Mean in event window -0.0053
Median in event window 0.005
Max in event window 0.033
Min in event window -0.058
Standard deviation in event window 0.0192
No. of total announcements 52
No. of CEOs/Chairmen announcements 2
No. of non-CEO directors announcements 50
No. of ϐirms 39
(AAR) of -1.9% two days before the announcement date,
at the 1% signiϐicance level. Other than an insigniϐicant
positive AAR on the announcement day, the trading days
after that see increasingly negative AARs and CAARs. It
appears that investors, after being initially cautiously op-
timistic with the appointment of female directors, subse-
quently quickly become fearful of what might lay ahead for
their investment in the ϐirm. On day 3, the AAR is -0.8% at a
signiϐicant level of 10% and, on day 4, a much more signif-
icant decrease of the AAR occurs at -1.2%, which is signiϐi-
cant at the 1% level.
Overall, the CAAR of -7.7% over the period (1, 10), which is
subsequent to the announcement day, is signiϐicant at the
1% level. These ϐindings support hypothesis H2 that listed
ϐirms in New Zealand experience a non-positive average ab-
normal return upon their announcement of the appoint-
ment of female directors. Consequently, hypothesis H2 is
therefore rejected.
TABLE 4. Cumulative average abnormal returns during window period
t AAR t-test CAARs t-test Positive Negative
-10 0.011 2.606*** 0.011 2.558*** 29 23
-9 0.033 7.632*** 0.044 7.236*** 24 28
-8 -0.050 -11.778*** -0.006 -0.806 14 38
-7 -0.002 -0.429 -0.008 -0.930 24 28
-6 -0.006 -1.333 -0.014 -1.456 22 30
-5 -0.002 -0.353 -0.016 -1.519 23 29
-4 0.000 -0.073 -0.016 -1.406 24 28
-3 0.000 -0.008 -0.016 -1.316 25 27
-2 -0.019 -4.446*** -0.035 -2.713*** 27 25
-1 0.000 0.046 -0.035 -2.574** 21 31
0 0.001 0.312 -0.034 -2.384** 16 36
1 -0.001 -0.229 -0.035 -2.350** 27 25
2 0.002 0.571 -0.033 -2.129** 25 277
3 -0.008 -1.850* -0.041 -2.548** 21 31
4 -0.012 -2.802*** -0.053 -3.182*** 26 26
5 -0.002 -0.571 -0.055 -3.198*** 25 27
6 0.012 2.764*** -0.043 -2.425** 21 31
7 0.002 0.496 -0.041 -2.247** 21 31
8 -0.013 -3.015*** -0.054 -2.881*** 28 24
9 -0.058 -13.465*** -0.112 -5.824*** 21 31
10 0.001 0.272 -0.111 -5.633*** 24 38
*, ** and *** indicate statistical signiϐicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5 presents the results of the AAR over a two-day event
window (0, 1) for how the appointment of females to dif-
ferent positions on the board is viewed by the market. In
particular, we observe that both announcements of CEO
and non-CEO female directors have negative AARs, which
again indicate that investors have a negative view toward
the appointment of female directors for any positions on
the board. However, the AARs of appointments of female
non-CEOpositions is less negative at -0.069%with a 10per-
cent level of signiϐicance comparedwith theAARof -0.188%
for that of female CEO appointments. The result rejects Hy-
pothesis H4 but is consistent with hypothesis H3 that the
market reacts more positively to the appointment of non-
CEO female directors. This result is consistent with those
in Kang et al. (2010) in the Singapore context. However, it
should be pointed out that, in the present study, the mar-
ket reacts negatively to both types of female appointments,
though it is less negative toward the appointment of non-
CEO female directors.
Figure 1 shows the plot of the CAAR over a 21-day event
window period. The graph shows the market reacting neg-
atively to the newsof the appointment of female directors to
the corporate board. The overall trend of CAARs decreases
over the event window of day -10 to day 10, especially from
day -2 to day 10.
TABLE 5. Average abnormal returns
Position AARs (%) t-statistics Positive Negative
CEO -0.188 -0.783 1 1
Non-CEO directors -0.069 -1.821* 20 30
FIGURE 1. CAARs
This result suggests that investors are not positively dis-
posed toward the appointment of female directors on the
corporate boards of NZX-listed ϐirms.
From these results, we can conclude that there is a negative
reaction in the market in the days following the announce-
ment of women directors in New Zealand. These ϐindings
are consistent to those of Virtanen (2012), who concludes
that there is a non-positive relation between the appoint-
ment of female directors and its market impact.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study offers empirical evidence on the market impact
from the appointment of female directors in listed ϐirms in
New Zealand. The results show that the market reacts neg-
atively to the announcements of the appointment of female
directors. Several explanations can be offered for the ϐind-
ings. First, themarketmay feel that there are disadvantages
of gender diversity. Under a high gender diversity board,
more effort and time would be required to achieve a con-
sensus while making decisions (Kang et al., 2010; Strom et
al., 2014). Secondly, Kanter (1997) explains the result with
the tokenism theory that female board members are more
likely to experience biasness and the “glass ceiling” due to
the reason that it is less common to have female members
on the board. Thirdly, it may due to the remaining impact of
ϐinancial crisis. In 2008, the global ϐinancial crisis created
an economic downturn worldwide, which encouraged in-
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vestors to act conservatively toward any investments. Other
possible reasons could be due to cultural preference and in-
vestors’ sentiment.
The results of this study are in line with the view that in-
vestors are less receptive to the role of CEO occupied by
female rather than non-CEO positions (Kang et al., 2010).
The position of CEOs in New Zealand ϐirms continues to
be lacking in gender diversity and female CEOs are under-
represented in corporate boards.
The ϐindings of this article have some practical implications
to policy makers. Although ϐirms that appoint women to
their boards can enjoy good publicity for their support of
gender diversity through the mass media, they should be
mindful of the negative market response that follows such
announcements, as evidenced by the results of this study.
Should ϐirms ϐind the need to appoint female directors, due
to their commitment toward gender diversity, it is advis-
able that they be appointed to the role of non-CEO directors
rather than CEO-directors. This is supported by the ϐind-
ings of this study that investors react less negatively to the
announcements of non-CEO female directors than those of
CEO-directors.
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